This paper explores the phenomenon of US quasi-bases in Latin America, semi-formal agreements that grant to the US military tacit access to local military bases without a formal lease. While the importance of formal US bases in the region has dramatically decreased, a network of quasi-bases provides critical support for US anti-drug operations from Central to South America. The paper builds on Alexander Cooley's theory of base politics (2008) to explain why formal bases are more difficult to open and maintain as democracy expands in the region, and categorizes previously unstudied quasi-base arrangements. Democratic expansion affects foreign military bases in three ways. Formal base negotiations are likely to succeed if the benefits of hosting foreign bases are not only perceived by the local government but also by the opposition. Conversely, when the benefits are concentrated in the government and its clients, excluded political groups are likely to oppose the base. The electoral strenght of the opposition and the existence of institutional mechanisms autonomous of the government increase the chances that the opposition will succeed in blocking the base negotiations. However, when formal basing agreements fail, or when the type of operations requires secrecy and informality, interested governments may still negotiate alternative arrangements, such as quasi-bases, which are more difficult for the opposition to contest.
In Latin America, as in other regions, formal US bases are in decline. During the twentieth century the US had heavily manned, town-sized, formal military bases in Panama, Guantamo, and Puerto Rico, and after the closure of bases in Panama in 1999 the US managed to negotiate the lease of four new ones. But after the electoral vistory of the radical left in Ecuador, the new government expelled the US from the base in its territory, forcing the United
States to initiate exploratory basing negotiations in Peru, Colombia, and Panama. Of these three, only Colombia accepted to move to formal negotiations, and despite the government's willingness to grant access to seven military bases in the country, the constitutional court ruled the new agreement unlawful and terminated the US's last hopes for new formal military bases in Latin America. After Colombia's defection, the only independent countries in Latin
America that officially host a US military base are El Salvador, where a minuscule annex to a local airport hosts a radar and serves as parking and fueling station for US airplanes, and Cuba, where the government opposes US occupation of the naval base of Guantanamo.
While this appears to be the end of the story for new formal US bases in the region, the parallel history of growing quasi-bases is striking.
Through informal negotiations, tacit agreements, and obscure appendixes to previous military cooperation treaties, the US managed to gain access to local military bases in Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Honduras. In Peru and Ecuador (after the closure of the Manta base), the US established access to local airports to land and refuel the airplanes that are supporting US anti-drug efforts in the Andes. More than 17 US radar sites spread between Peru an Colombia. 3 In Colombian bases, the US maintains a permanent force of around 300 US troops, which could potentially be raised to 800 if needed. None of these countries has formally leased base space to the United States, yet the US utilizes and partially controls several military facilities in each one of them. In practice, these military installations, or quasi-bases, function similarly to formal US bases, but their existence is legally ambiguous, and their future is uncertain. Yet it is largely through these alternative arrangements that the US is fighting drug-trafficking and countering security threats in Latin America.
Increasingly, formal bases are almost too difficult to open and maintain because they are likely to become trapped in political struggles between the host government and its domestic opposition. In contrast, quasi-bases are negotiated with host governments with little publicity and made effective with little congressional oversight or civil society participation.
The evolution of the US overseas basing strategy
Two major evolutions in the strategic vision of the US affect its bases overseas. One of them is the result of a public debate about the transformation of US global strike capabilities The global reach of US military capacity is not sustained only from its overseas bases.
In the very first moments of the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan, for example, the US military sent B-2 stealth bombers based in Missouri more than 7,000 miles away to destroy the Taliban's air capacity and communications systems 6 . Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UVAs), such as the Global Hawk, can perform strikes and surveillance operations up to 33 hours of uninterrupted flight without landing in overseas bases. 7 The outstanding capacity of the US military to operate from the country's mainland and own territories overseas has led some,
like William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, to argue that the United States can reduce its military presence in the rest of the world, and especially does not need to continue to pay the legitimacy costs of maintaining a network of bases in foreign nations. 8
The US military developed its capacity to operate from its homeland into distant territories since the Cold War, and in its aftermath it has continued to strengthen its long range options. Bombers, UVAs, satellites, naval deployments, and communications systems continue to be developed by different agencies and the branches of the US military. Maritime deployments, consisting of US Navy vessels in international waters, seem to be an alternative to land bases in foreign territories under the strategic concept of "Sea basing." The general 4 Chalmers Johnson, "Garrisoning the planet." TomDispatch.com, Jan. 15, 2004.
5 David Vine, "US Empire of bases grows." TomDispatch.com, July 15th, 2012.
6 (Calder 2007, p.211) 7 According to data from the security equipment manufacturer Northrop Grumman available at http:// www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/GlobalHawk/Pages/default.aspx (Last accessed April 19th, 2013) 8 Odom and Dujarric 2005 trend in US strategic thinking, it would seem, favors a long-range and automated strike force to eliminate the need for US permanent deployments of troops in foreign territories. 9 Opponents of US military bases overseas in US policy circles argue that they are expensive, erode US legitimacy, and do not serve to achieve this century's security goals. In fact, after the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States vacated around 60% of its foreign bases. 10 Permanent, town-sized, and heavily manned bases appear to be a less attractive option to the US military, as smaller, more flexible and often temporary installations have spread throughout the regions where the United States carries security operations. Latin America is not an exception. The large bases in Panama gave way to smaller, yet more numerous, bases at different times being used in almost every country in Central America and in the Andes.
The Colamapa air base in El Salvador, for example, is a tiny annex to a civilian airport that serves the capital, San Salvador. This base hosts a radar, a few hangars for US planes, and minimal installations for a few personnel that does not engage in combat operations.
Large bases, called Main Operating Bases (MOB), are still important albeit less numerous.
The bases built and operated by the US military overseas in the last few years include both large and small bases. Some bases in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the United States opened 505 military bases from 2003 to 2011, are as large as US towns, with up to 27-mile fortified perimeters, fire departments, bus routes, fast-food restaurants, and internet cafes. 11
In Vicenza, Italy, where the Camp Ederle base already exists, the United States is enlarging its Dal Molin base, capable of hosting more than 2,000 soldiers. In addition, the US continues to operate large bases in Germany, Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere.
In addition to MOBs, the United States has increased the creation of "Lily pads," smaller bases like Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) or Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs), which are formally recognized by the United States and the host government, and other 9 Calder 2007, p.214 10 David Vine, "US Empire of bases grows." TomDispatch.com, July 15th, 2012.
11 David Vine, "US Empire of bases grows." TomDispatch.com, July 15th, 2012.
informal bases which are not. 12 At a cost of $140 billion in 2012, the cost of US bases overseas indicates a massive US investment in expanding the network of operating locations abroad. 13 The strategic shift towards smaller bases has been accompanied with the pursuit of more secretive bases, including lily pads, which has created new forms of operations and engagements for the US military overseas. The goal of this new strategy is to avoid publicity and opposition, both from the local population and from US citizens. 14 The goal of reduced publicity has certainly been achieved, notes David Vine, as Congressional oversight over these bases has been minimal and has received almost no media attention. The result of this unsupervised strategy, Vine continues, is the US involvement in new areas of the world and new conflicts, with potentially disastrous consequences, from Djibouti to Honduras. 15 Secret US operations in the last few years include drone missions in Pakistan and Mexico, anti-drug operations in Honduras, and tens of millions of dollars for civil wars in Africa. 16 This paper differentiates between formal US bases, including MOBs, Forward Operating Locations, and Cooperative Security Locations, and quasi-bases, including secret bases and those where no formal lease authorizes the use of a local base by the United States military.
In practice, these bases all operate in similar ways, as they all provide physical space overseas for US military operations. Bases and quasi-bases are not fundamentally differentiated by their size either. Some formal US bases in Latin America are very small, like the Forward Operating Location in El Salvador, while some quasi-bases are larger and strategically more important, like the Soto Cano base in Honduras, where the Southern Command deploys its Joint Task Force Bravo. Bases and quasi-bases differ, however, on the contractual validity of formal bases, which quasi-bases lack, and this makes a difference on the politics of bases and 12 As David Vine notes, the name of these bases recalls a frog jumping across a pond toward its prey. See David Vine, "US Empire of bases grows." TomDispatch.com, July 15th, 2012.
13 David Vine, "Picking up a $170 billion tab," TomDispatch.com, Dec. 11th, 2012 14 
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16 Turse 2012 in their long-term stability. This differentiation is explored further below.
In Latin America, the United States has pursued both formal bases and quasi-bases.
In the last decade, the United States negotiated successfully the renewal of the FOL in El Salvador and sought to pressure Ecuador to renew another one. After failing to maintain its presence in Ecuador, the United States explored the possibility of a new formal base in Peru, and of several Cooperative Security Locations in Colombia. After these negotiations failed, the US accepted to operate from quasi-bases in each of these countries. In addition, the United States successfully managed to operate from secretive quasi-bases in Guatemala and Costa Rica, and continued to occupy the Soto Cano base in Honduras.
The shift in US strategic basing explains why the United States has sought to open quasibases all over Central America. What this shift does not explain, though, is why the United
States failed to open formal miltiary bases in Colombia and Peru, and failed to renew its base in Ecuador, even when it actively pursued formal agreements with each country. In these cases, quasi-bases where not the preferred option, but an alternative when formal bases where not possible. The next section explores how domestic politics in Latin America is making it more and more difficult for the United States to open or maintain its formal bases, and how this is contributing to the spread of quasi-bases.
Why do formal base negotiations fail?
US military bases overseas sustain the projection of US power on a global scale. Ranging from full size towns with multiple facilities to minimal installations for pieces of strategic equipment, US military bases around the globe serve as multiplicators of the capacity of the United States to act as the only global power in the international system. 17 But in order to sustain a network of bases, the United States has had to establish different forms of legal and semi-legal arrangements where the host nation permits the use of a part of its territory for US installations. In many cases, these arrangements are not problematic, but in other cases they the host country. The process of democratization in Latin America, as elsewhere, is one of the major causes of the increased difficulty to negotiate formal basing agreements. As democracies consolidate, political opportunities are greater for civil society groups to "penetrate" the state and influence state decisions even in the realm of national security 21 Three specific dynamics associated with democratic consolidation limit the ability of host governments to open formal basing agreements with the United States: the benefits perceived by the opposition, the electoral challenges from the opposition, and the consolidation of institutional independent veto players.
Gains for the opposition
Gains from accepting foreign military bases can be concentrated in the government and a small group of political allies, or they can spread to different political groups even if they are not participating in the ruling coalition. In some situations, the benefits of US bases benefit political groups regardless of their connections to government officials. In contrast, and more often, the political benefits of foreign bases are concentrated on the ruling coalition, or even the leader and his or her family and close political allies. When basing negotiations benefit all or most politically relevant groups, including the opposition, one should not expect US bases to become highly politicized issues, given that losing the base will act against the interest of most politically relevant groups. One could even expect the basing agreement to be openly debated in the legislative body of the country, including participation of the opposition, and in this way gain the legitimacy of congressional ratification.
But when the benefits are offered to, or concentrated in, only the ruling elite, basing agreements are more difficult to "sell" to the public. Authoritarian regimes do not often worry about political gains for the opposition, but democratically elected leaders depend on support from the electorate, and they fear that if the opposition is not benefited from basing agreements, these excluded groups might mobilize the population against them. Formal base 21 Yeo 2011, 21 negotiations are still possible in non-authoritarian regimes, but only when the opposition is too weak to contest them or when the opposition perceives the possibility of political gains from accepting the base.
Electoral challenge
As explained before, if the domestic opposition perceives political gains from basing agreements, these are more likely to be successful and stable. But when US bases benefit only the government and its clients, the opposition is likely to oppose the base and seek political advantages from challenging the legitimacy of the basing agreement. If this is the case, two new mechanisms related to the strength of the opposition play a role in explaining when agreements succeed or fail. First, the opposition might attempt to block the base agreement in Congress if it has sufficient votes, or impeach ministers or even the president if the agreement is not sent in for congressional approval. This of course requires that the opposition is widely represented in the legislature, and that it can rally enough votes. If it is not, the opposition can still appeal to the electorate and seek either a referendum or support in general elections. Common electoral tactics for the opposition include accusing the government of compromising the sovereignty of the country and mobilizing nationalistic and anti-US sentiment in the country. However, If the opposition is not strong enough to pose a political or electoral challenge for the government, this mechanism does not work, and the government can still approve a formal basing lease that concentrates its benefits in the government and its clients. If this is the case, one might expect the agreement to be implemented by the government but not put to a vote in Congress, where the opposition could magnify its political power by exposing the contents of the agreement as violations of the state sovereignty.
Institutional veto players
The second mechanism that can help the opposition block the agreement is the use of the country's institutions to challenge the validity of US bases. In more consolidated democracies, independent courts will have the final say about the legality of a basing agreement, and their rule is to be accepted by governments despite their political dominance. In particular, when basing agreements are not ratified by the legislature, the opposition is likely to make the case that new treaties need to be ratified before they acquire legal validity. If strong independent institutions exist in the country, the validity of basing agreements might be questioned and the bases rejected even if the opposition is not strong electorally or politically.
However, the consolidation of Latin American democratic institutions is uneven. In many cases, governments are able to manipulate high courts and other institutions to force them to abstain from reviewing basin agreements or they can ignore their rulings. If no independent institutions can "veto" the government's actions, this mechanism fails to magnify the claims of the opposition and formal basing agreements are likely to succeed even if they are opposed by political groups and their legality is questionable.
The crucial point for the process of opening a foreign base lies in the balance between the benefits to the government and its allies and the challenges from the domestic opposition.
When the benefits are large enough and they are perceived by both the government and the opposition, there is no major risk of politicization, but this is very rarely the case. More often, the benefits of a base are concentrated in the ruling coalition or even personally in the leader. 22 In that case, one should expect opposition forces to react to a possible foreign base in their territory, and use it as a political card against the government. The challenges that the opposition poses to the government depend on the organizational capacity of the opposition and the resources that it can mobilize.
In the case of Latin American politics, opposition forces are likely to mobilize successfully against US military bases given the population's widespread concern about US interventionism and a cultural shared idea about the importance of sovereignty for Latin Americans.
Opposition forces in Latin America are very likely to attempt to politicize any basing agreement with the United States.
An ideal typical path of base negotiations through the two levels described before is 
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25 Revista Semana, Abec de la decisin de la Corte sobre las base militares August 18th, 2010. Available at http://www.semana.com/nacion/abece-decision-corte-constitucional-sobre-bases-militares/ 143211-3.aspx. AccessedAugust6th,2012. drug strategy, and offered to allow US planes to land and refuel in Ecuador's airports and bases. Similarly, after the constitutional court vetoed the agreement of the formal bases, the Colombian govenrment also offered wide informal base access to the United States, which continues to this day.
3 Quasi-bases in Latin America In contemporary Latin America, quasi-bases have arisen from failed negotiations over formal military bases in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. In contrast, quasi-bases have served as the preferred option for US operations in Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica. With the exception of El Salvador, the United States seems to prefer quasi-bases in Central America, where a heavy portion of the current war against drugs is taking place, whereas in the Andean countries of South America it preferred (and failed to obtain) formal bases.
Quasi-bases, which are not approved by local legislatures and are not open for citizen oversight, and provide a better tactic option for US secretive operations in these countries.
While the US does not count with formal leases and legal standing for its operational facilities in these countries, through quasi-bases it has been able to carry out secret operations such Negotiations continued in July 2007, discussing the details of US operations in Peru. By this time it was clear that the agreement was to be presented as US operations originating from a Peruvian base in Piura, without any form of base lease. Garcia feared the opposition (which was strong enough to win the presidency a few years later) would benefit from a public debate about military bases in Peru, and decided to turn instead to an informal gas-and-go agreement, allowing surveillance P-3 flights from Piura. 36
The surveillance agreement became a second best option for the US after Peruvian officials sought to eliminate any language and formal procedures for extended control over a Peruvian 
Temporary ground access
The United States has reached agreements with different countries where US troops and operations are allowed in local military bases, without a formal lease, but with an agreement 41 US embassy in Quito. Cable 08QUITO53 42 US embassy in Quito. Cable 08QUITO158 that specifies the time lapse before the bases have to be vacated or their access renewed.
These agreements lack the specifications of a formal base lease, such as a clear understanding about uses of the assets in the base, which are usually negotiated secretly and informally with the local government. These agreements usually specify the maximum number of US troops allowed, but often refer to a total number in the country without specifying the actual occupation of the base. While still controversial, temporal access to local military bases is often the product of a concrete security concern from the local government, which makes it easier to "sell" to the local population.
Guatemala
As part of the Operación Martillo, the US sent 171 Marines to the Guatemalan Base Aerea del Sur near the Pacific Ocean, in August 2012. The government denied it had allowed the US to operate a military base in the country, and instead argued the operation was a continuation of previous agreements on the "free transit of air craft" signed with the United States. Far from an aircraft transit operation, the US personnel in Guatemala was granted permission to engage in anti-drug military operations, operate heavy armed helicopters, occupy a part of the Base Aerea del Sur, and build military facilities in it through US contractors. 44 The agreement is set to expire after 120 days, but its renewal does not require more than the President's authorization that made it effective in the first place. In this way, US access to Guatemala escapes the constitutional requirement for congressional ratification of any agreement that allows foreign troops in the country's soil.
The US presence in the Base de Sur is supported by the nearby base of Colamapa in El
Salvador and the Soto Cano base in Honduras. US troops are supposed to only find drug-laden planes and boats along Guatemalan coastlines. However, domestic forces will supposedly be doing the fighting, according to Obama administration spokesmen, who alleged that U.S. The most intense armed operations against drug-traffic in Latin America is carried out by marines stationed in Guatemala, with support from the heavily armed fourth fleet. Out of the coast of Guatemala, several frigates, like the US Navy USS Nicholas, use war equipment to capture drug traffickers and seize shipments. About a thousand tons of cocaine are shipped from Latin America to the United States, 80% through sea routes near Guatemala and Honduras, and the rest through the territory of these same countries. 47
Costa Rica
Costa Rica, a country without an army of its own, invited the United States military to patrol its coasts in 2010. Framed as an agreement to fight drug-trafficking in the country's seas, the invitation was backed by both the government and the legislative. The agreement allowed the deployment of 7.000 US troops, 46 warships, 42 helicopters and five planes. 48 The terms allowed US operations in Costa Rica for six months, starting in January 2011, and is to be renewed every six months. The agreement does not lease any military base or port to the United States, and instead vaguely allows the United States to use ports and installations, including the naval base outside of Liberia in the north of the country, near the 45 The New American, "Critics Slam Obama Deployment of U.S. Troops to Guatemala for Drug War" Available at http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/foreign-policy/item/ 12749-critics-slam-obama-deployment-of-us-troops-to-guatemala-for-drug-war Accessed Oct 19th, 2012 46 Univision, "Operacin Martillo (parte 1): la Marina de EEUU y su misin en la guerra contra las drogas" Available at http://noticias.univision.com/noticiero-univision/videos/video/2012-07-10/ busqueda-de-narcotraficantes-en-altamar Accessed Oct 19th, 2012 border with Nicaragua. The United States has upgraded the installations in the base and installed a radar to monitor aerial traffic in the region. 49 The US presence in the base in Liberia and other installations is surrounded by strict secrecy, due to the high sensitiveness of the Costa Rican public, who praise the lack of a standing military of their own, against foreign military bases in its territory. 50 Even so, the US Base Structure Report of 2012 lists one unnamed US installation in Costa Rica.
Long-term or indefinite ground access
Long-term or indefinite access to local military bases is the closest form of arrangement to a formal military base. However, long-term quasi-bases still lack the specifications of a formal lease, and instead depend on ambiguous agreements and appendixes to previous military cooperation treaties. The expectation of a long-term occupation of the base allows more US investments and developments, as well as longer operational capacity transferred to the base. At the same time that this gives continuity to the base, it also raises the risk of new governments seeking to benefit from the base and its assets, which lie in a legal void given the absence of a formal agreement.
Honduras
Since the mid twentieth century, the United States had conducted occasional operations in Honduras, and after the Sandinista toppled the government in neighboring Nicaragua, the pro-US government of Honduras sought help from Washington to contain the spill over effects With the fall of the agreement, the US also got rid of a dangerous informal commitment to support Colombia in the case of a conflict with Venezuela. The so-called Track II negotiations did not materialize into an anti-aerial defense system and assurances of access to US arms, systems, or technology, as President Uribe had hoped. Despite the secrecy of national security issues, evidence suggests that a potential war with Venezuela was more likely to come from Uribe's personal aspirations and not from Chavez's initiative. In a recent statement, President Uribe declared he had already planned a military operation against the FARC in Venezuelan territory, which according to Chavez would have sparked a war between the two countries.
Uribe revealed he had received information about military camps of the FARC in Venezuela, and he just did not have enough time before the change of administration to carry out the attack. 62
Bases and quasi-bases: analytical differences
Bases and quasi-bases are very similar in their operational dynamics, as both can host US military personnel, equipment, and operations. But they differ in some key aspects. First, formal bases are supported by base leases or agreements that define the terms of the use of the bases, including a time period before which the base cannot be legally closed. This is the case of the Colamapa base in El Salvador and it was the case of the Manta base in Ecuador. As most international contracts, these agreements provide semi-legal guarantees of the stability of the bases that in theory must be respected by the signing parties even if a change of government makes the agreement unwanted by one of them. Even though such legality is soft at best, given the lack of an international body capable of enforcing international contracts in the realm of security, breaking the terms of an existing contract is problematic. The case of Ecuador is illustrative. Even when president Correa won the election in 2006 on nationalistic and anti-US bases platform, he had to allow the Manta base to operate until late 2009, when the initial terms of the base lease expired. On the other hand, quasi-bases do not need to specify the temporary terms of the bases, or the type of operations and the number of personnel. While these aspects might be regulated through other formal or informal agreements (for example, the US Congress has set a maximum cap for US soldiers in Colombia), quasi-bases offer flexibility to increase or decrease the size of operations as needed. The stability of quasi-bases depends, however, on a continuous collaboration with the host government. In cases of changes of government, or radical changes of the foreign relations of the host country, the bases are automatically at risk. Since no agreement exists to provide legal standing for quasi-bases, expulsion of US personnel can come at any time after political changes in the host country.
The parallel between Honduras and Ecuador is revealing. Ecuador opened a formal US FOL in 1999, while Honduras had granted access to the United States to the Soto Cano base on a quasi-base type agreement since 1983. Both countries welcomed US troops when their governments were friendly to the United States, but eventually the opposition replaced them through electoral victory. Although the new elected leader of Honduras, Manuel Zelaya, did not voice a clear anti-US rhetoric during his campaign, he grew increasingly closer to Hugo Chavez to the point of joining the anti-US ALBA alliance. At this point, Zelaya decided to intervene in the Soto Cano military base to build a civilian airport using the US controlled airstrip. Even though the United States had controlled this facility since 1983, the lack of a formal lease contract allowed the new president to challenge the exclusive authority of the US over this key installation. In contrast, president Rafael Correa of Ecuador ran a campaign based on anti-US rhetoric which specifically used his opposition to the US base to court the support of nationalistic factions in the country. Once in office, Correa proceeded to inform the US embassy of his intention to not terminate the base agreement. However, because the base specified a 10 year lease before the base could be unilaterally terminated, president Correa had to wait for three years after his inauguration for the terms of the lease to expire, and finally fulfill his election promise of expelling US troops from Ecuador.
The infamous Guantanamo base in Cuba is another example of the importance of formal leases for the stability of basing agreements. The United States signed an agreement with the first government of Cuba in 1903, leasing the naval installation in the bay of Guantanamo to the United States perpetually, although the territory remains under the formal sovereignty of Cuba. After the revolution, the new government denounced the agreement, arguing that it was illegitimately signed under US occupation. The United States responded arguing that since the Castro government had cashed one of the checks that the United States sends to Cuba as rent for the base, it had endorsed the agreement fully. The Castros still claim that the check was cashed by mistake, amidst the confusion of the first days of the revolution.
Since then, the United States has never failed to send a monthly check to Havana, which the government keeps uncashed. The power disparity between Cuba and the United States is clear, and in the absence of a formal lease for Guantanamo, the United States would probably resort to coercion and threats to maintain its base, but the apparently silly argument about the only check cashed supports US' contractual authority over Guantanamo and prevents the issue of the base from escalating to a military confrontation 63 .
As a result, neither bases nor quasi-bases are necessarily more stable, but their stability depends on different variables. While bases depend on the stability of the terms of their lease, and can endure changes of governments, the stability of quasi-bases is closely linked with the continuity of friendly governments in the host country. Quasi-bases, on the other hand, escape political oversight and civil society criticism due to their secrecy and the lack of official recognition of the existence of bases. In this environment, it is only when the media and opposition leaders gather enough information that quasi-bases receive the fate of bases as targets of transnational mobilization.
Apart from their own stability challenges, quasi-bases can themselves be a source of regional destabilization. The presence of foreign troops is already a common tension in regional politics around the world, but unofficial base-like agreements are potentially even more destabilizing. As no formal agreement is available, the hosts of US base-like arrangements are likely to send ambiguous signals to their neighbor countries and regional powers and provoke anxiety and mistrust among them. When a significant US deployment arrives in a country without previous congressional debate or other form of public deliberation, uninformed neighbors of the country, especially those not aligned with the United States, are likely to suspect that their security could be compromised. Foreign troops are closer to their borders, and high tech equipment could be used to monitor their activities across the border; and since no formal agreement stands, these destabilizing activities could already be allowed in an informal agreement between the US and the host government. Even if the US and the host country make assurances to the region that the US force and equipment shall not be used against them, rational political leaders in neighboring countries could suspect that just the availability of those troops and equipment might break regional balances of power. This way, the United States has bypassed the obstacles of formal basing negotiations and has managed to continue to pursue its security interests in Latin America. While formal bases seem to be no longer an option in the region, given the high risk of politicization, quasi-bases have provided access to the US military to many countries in Latin America, including those were formal bases were denied.
Formal bases have already been studied and conceptualized in the literature. Quasi-bases, on the other hand, have so far been studied indistinctly as bases, or ignored. In this study, three types of quasi-bases were observed. On the lowest level of formality and commitment, Ecuador and Peru opened quasi-bases on a "gas and go" scheme, where US military planes are allowed to land and refuel, and their crew are allowed to spend a short time. In these type of quasi-bases, US personnel is not allowed to conduct operations or operate intelligence or communications equipment from the bases. These facilities do, however, serve the in the network of military facilities where the United States is able to project its aerial capacities.
US troops may be stationed and may operate in temporary access bases, a second type of quasi-base. Guatemala and Costa Rica recently allowed the US to operate from local bases, from where the US manages communications and intelligence equipment, trains local forces, and in some cases engages in actual combat against drug-traffickers in the sea routes leading to Central America. The access to these bases and operations were restricted by both governments to short periods of time, in both cases under a year. No treaty or contractual obligation establishes the lease of bases, but the "security cooperation" agreements that allowed the US to operate from these countries specified that the government was required to revise and renew the authorization for US military access to these countries periodically. In practice, as long as the governments of these countries continue to align their security policies with the United States, no major source of instability is likely to arise for these agreements. been divided into three levels of closeness or "alignment" with the United States, using two revealing, although imperfect, proxies. In the first column appear countries that have a free trade agreement with the United States, as a proxy for their alignment with the United States.
In the third column appear countries that have joined the Venezuela-led Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA), which openly contests US military presence in the region. In the middle column appear countries that are neither align nor oppose the United States.
As we would expect, a cluster of countries in the north-west corner of figure 3 indicates that countries that are aligned with the United States through free trade are also more likely to offer bases or the quasi-bases alternative to their northern neighbor. In contrast, all the countries members of ALBA are reluctant to offer access to the US military to their bases and territories. Ecuador compromised after it evicted the US from its base in Manta, and allowed a gas and go program. The stability of quasi-bases is a challenge for US security policy. On the one hand, the secrecy and informality of quasi-bases helps maintain the bases outside of the domestic political arena, allowing the host government to extract benefits from allowing US operations in the country with minimal oversight from the local opposition. But on the other hand, the lack of a formal lease makes quasi-basing agreements depend on the continuity of friendly 70 Yeo 2011 , Vine 2011 , Lutz 2009 , Lindsay-Poland 2009 host governments and their political allies. If a radical faction of the opposition manages to win a presidential election, all informal agreements from the previous administrations are immediately in danger. As the cases of Ecuador and Cuba showed, formal leases serve as semi-legal protections against arbitrary (or even justified) expulsions in the context of changes of government, at least until the initial terms of the base lease expire. While no contract is unbreakable in international relations, formal lease agreements carry much more legal weight than the ambiguous informal arrangements that support quasi-bases.
